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“Being Alive is a Crock of Shit” – Kurt Vonnegut’s  
Kind Pessimism 
 
Andrew Hicks 
University of Bristol 
 
Kurt Vonnegut, long considered one of the arch-misanthropes of the American literary canon, could 
more accurately be said to have only fallen into genuine cynicism at the very end of his life. Before 
this final despair, however, Vonnegut was a trenchant critic of a variety of aspects of American 
culture. In The Sirens of Titan (1959) and Slapstick (1976), Vonnegut respectively satirises the self-
made myth of the American Dream and tackles the issue of modern loneliness. In both novels, he 
proposes far more modest but perhaps more achievable and compassionate goals than those 
promised by American convention – goals that only appear pessimistically limited in light of 
unrealistic or unfulfilled ideals. 
 
“Life is no way to treat an animal, not even a mouse.” 
— Kurt Vonnegut, A Man Without A Country 
 
In his recently released biography of Kurt Vonnegut, Charles Shields accurately asserts that “it’s 
become axiomatic that [he] is Mark Twain’s heir in style and outlook” (252) – and certainly, when 
Vonnegut finally found fame with Slaughterhouse Five, he took to imitating his forebear in more ways 
than one. Vonnegut, like Twain, discovered in the second half of his career a niche “plying the [public 
reading] circuit with droll stories” (236) for cash. He dressed similarly for a period – in the early 1970s, 
the novelist Hilary Masters derisively described Vonnegut’s “Mark Twain impression…baggy white suit, 
bushy hair, and flowing moustache…my attitude toward Vonnegut was that he was something of a 
poseur” (qtd. in Shields 302). However, self-conscious theatricality aside - Sam Clemens, after all, also 
did a fairly good Mark Twain impression - the most striking (and seemingly “authentic”) parallel 
between the two writers is the profound pessimism that overtook them in later life. Robert Douglas 
notes that “the twilight of Twain’s life was one of complete despair and hopelessness. He lived to see 
everything taken from him…Hence he took refuge in the fact that there is nothing – “life is but an empty 
dream”” (4). Indeed, in his late works, Twain often declared life itself a curse, and death a gift devoutly 
to be wished for all. Although the elderly Vonnegut only rarely called for the universal end of humanity, 
he certainly did not consider life to be any great treasure. Nor, in his own estimation, did anyone else, 
consciously or not.1 The kind pessimism that had characterised his career up until the new millennium—
a compassionate understanding of man’s essential limitedness—fell, finally, into abject cynicism and 
despair. At the heart of Vonnegut’s latter day pessimism is a profound disappointment with the state of 
early 21st century American politics, and an accompanying disillusionment with the American Dream – 
products, perhaps, of a lifelong belief in the “idealistic, pacifistic” America of yesteryear: 
I was taught in the sixth grade that we had a standing army of just over a hundred thousand 
men and that the generals had nothing to say about what was done in Washington. I was taught 
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to be proud of that and to pity Europe for having more than a million men under arms and 
spending all their money on airplanes and tanks. I simply never unlearned junior civics. I still 
believe in it. I got a very good grade. (Conversations with Kurt Vonnegut 103) 
What seems to have most disturbed Vonnegut was not so much the violence, exploitation and inequality 
of recent American realpolitik, but its disparity with the “City upon a Hill” imagery of American moral 
exceptionalism with which he had grown up. As he notes in A Man Without A Country, the idea of a 
“humane and reasonable America” was a dream that survived “the Great Depression, when there were 
no jobs…and then we fought and often died for that dream during the Second World War, when there 
was no peace” – but in 2007, Vonnegut can only avow that “I know now that there is not a chance in 
hell of America becoming humane and reasonable…because power corrupts us, and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely” (71). Whether or not the social deprivation of the Great Depression or the violence 
of the Second World War compare to their modern counterparts seems almost immaterial to the 
sanctity of the junior civics dream. Something other than material conditions, in Vonnegut’s opinion, 
seems to have changed – there has been an ideological shift with regard to notions of personal and 
national power. 
As Tony Tanner notes in City of Words, the history of American literature is littered with 
examples of writers struggling with ideas of power, control and agency: 
There is an abiding dream in American literature that an unpatterned, unconditioned life is 
possible, in which your movements and stillnesses, choices and repudiations are all your own; 
and that there is also an abiding American dread that someone else is patterning your life, that 
there are all sorts of invisible plots afoot to rob you of your autonomy of thought and action, 
and that condition is ubiquitous. (15) 
It is not an exaggeration to suggest that the vast majority of Vonnegut’s work is concerned with a 
sustained investigation into the latter concept, though his position on the matter is far more ambiguous 
than “dread”. The “abiding dream” that Tanner describes is, of course, the American Dream – a belief 
in the possibility of absolute autonomy, independence and self-made success, no matter what one’s 
personal beginnings. It encompasses, in short, the “Horatio Alger” myth. Alger’s classic American 
narrative posits that with dogged determination, quick wits and moral purity, one can pull oneself up 
by one’s bootstraps and achieve a life of wealth and respectability, despite the depredations of 
circumstance. It is this myth that Vonnegut repeatedly took to task in his writing: 
I have customarily written about powerless people who felt there wasn’t much they could do 
about their situations…It goes against the American storytelling grain to have someone in a 
situation he can’t get out of, but I think this is very usual in life…it strikes me as gruesome and 
comical that in our culture we have an expectation that a man can always solve his problems. 
There is that implication that if you just have a little more energy, a little more fight, the problem 
can always be solved. This is so untrue that it makes me want to cry – or laugh. (Wampeters, 
Foma and Granfalloons 231) 
What is at stake, at the heart of the American self-made myth, is the question of free will – the ability, 
over and above economic, social, political, familial or biological circumstances, to act in a way that is 
determined only by one’s own volition, with the concomitant right to claim that one is solely responsible 
for one’s success. Throughout his career, Vonnegut sought to complicate the relationship between will 
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and action, between favour and happenstance – to complicate, in short, the foundational principles of 
the American Dream, while retaining and celebrating the idealistic, pacifistic values of the junior civics 
dream. His ultimate pessimism rested on the belief that the former had reached its apotheosis in 
neoliberal America, while the latter had been left, abandoned, by the wayside. Nevertheless, the 
worldview that emerges from his life’s work continues to undermine virtually every aspect of the self-
made myth, and may be more relevant today than ever. 
 
“I was a victim of a series of accidents, as are we all.” 
— The Space Wanderer, The Sirens of Titan 
 
The Sirens of Titan (1959), Vonnegut’s sophomore novel, is a bizarre, complex and picaresque 
tale, set across the length and breadth of the solar system, in which the entire plot is revealed to the 
reader (and the protagonist) within the very first chapter. Malachi Constant, the richest man on Earth, 
is invited to the home of Winston Niles Rumfoord, “a member of the one true American class” (20) and 
pioneering space adventurer. Rumfoord and his dog, Kazak, have become “chrono-synclastically 
infundibulated…wave phenomena - apparently pulsing in a distorted spiral with its origin in the Sun 
and its terminal in Betelgeuse” (11). Scattered across space and time, Rumfoord simultaneously 
experiences the past, present and future, and is able to appear in multiple places at once – from the 
perspective of the merely “punctual”, he regularly materialises and dematerialises as planets and objects 
orbit in and out of the ribbon he has become. Rumfoord reveals to Constant that he will travel to Mars, 
Mercury, back to Earth, and finally to Titan, siring a child along the way with Rumfoord’s wife Beatrice. 
During his travels, he will be press-ganged and have his memory wiped by the Martian army, become 
exiled on Mercury, and be hailed as the messiah of a new religion on Earth. Unsurprisingly, both 
Constant and Beatrice find the idea of predestination ridiculous and distasteful, respectively. 
Nevertheless, their attempts to defy the deterministic forces that will lead them into space only serve to 
further confirm Rumfoord’s prediction. As Rumfoord tells Beatrice, knowing how something will 
happen has absolutely no bearing on whether it will happen: 
“Look,” said Rumfoord, “life for a punctual person is like a roller coaster…sure, I can see the 
whole roller coaster you’re on. And sure – I could give you a piece of paper that would tell you 
about every dip and turn, warn you about every bogeyman that was going to pop out at you in 
the tunnels. But that wouldn’t help you any … because you’d still have to take the roller-coaster 
ride … I didn’t design the roller coaster, I don’t own it, and I don’t say who rides and who 
doesn’t.” (41) 
In The Sirens of Titan, characters consistently misunderstand or flat out ignore the differences between 
action and volition, between determinism and fate. Malachi Constant inherited his fabulous wealth 
from his father Noel, and in a deft and hilarious pastiche of the Prosperity gospel, the reader soon 
discovers that Noel made his fortune by investing in companies whose initials correspond to the 
sequential letters in the Bible. It is “a system so idiotically simple that some people can’t understand it 
… people who have to believe, for their own peace of mind, that tremendous wealth can be produced 
only by tremendous cleverness” (52). Malachi cannot help but interpret this incredible dumb luck as a 
work of intentionality. Even if the intention was neither his or his father’s (his running phrase, 
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throughout the novel, is “I guess somebody up there likes me”), he longs to live up to his name by 
delivering “a first class message from God to someone equally distinguished” (14). Yet, as the novel’s 
plot unfurls, it becomes increasingly obvious that the actions of Constant and every other being in the 
novel are ultimately determined entirely by external forces. Rumfoord himself is outraged to discover 
that he has been manipulated by the robotic remnants of an alien civilisation from a planet named 
Tralfamadore, who have “reached into the Solar System, picked me up, and used me like a handy-dandy 
potato peeler!” (199) And beyond the Tralfamadorians? As Peter J Reed notes, “perhaps only the 
meaningless, arbitrary workings of the Universe … in making the Tralfamadorian machines the last 
traceable source of control, the novel goes a long way toward implying a purely mechanical Universe.” 
(85) The ever-widening spiral of influence encompasses the mechanical and the organic, the inanimate 
and the sentient, to the point where there is ultimately no discernible difference between them – there 
is only the mechanical motion of cause and effect. 
Not for nothing does Vonnegut choose two members of the American upper class – one a 
member of the nouveau riche, the other the personification of old money – to be the hapless playthings 
of forces totally beyond their control. The vicissitudes of circumstance rain on the socially powerful and 
the powerless alike, and neither, in this deterministic model, warrant praise or blame for what happens 
to them. The natural response to this is, perhaps, an insistence on the dream of the “unpatterned, 
unconditioned life”, a refusal to look under the proverbial hood. Vonnegut demonstrates this desire in 
a literal manner with the spaceships designed to ferry Martian troops to Earth: 
The only controls available to those on board were two push-buttons…one labelled on and one 
labelled off. The on button simply started a flight from Mars. The off button was connected to 
nothing. It was installed at the insistence of Martian mental health experts, who said that 
human beings were always happier with machinery they thought they could turn off. (119) 
The illusion of control is a seductive one, and may even be a constitutive part of our psychological make-
up.2 Indeed, many Vonnegut critics insist upon it. Lawrence Broer, for instance, contends that the action 
of The Sirens of Titan, a “soulless, mechanistic nightmare”, is in fact a hallucination of Constant’s - one 
he must awaken from if he is “to negotiate his own destiny” (43). Nevertheless, there are valid 
approaches to life that take into account our essentially determined nature, and Vonnegut provides 
several examples in The Sirens of Titan. When Constant (temporarily named Unk after losing his 
memory) and a fellow Martian soldier named Boaz are trapped on Mercury, Unk restlessly roams its 
tunnels, “at war with his environment”, convinced that it is “either malevolent or cruelly mismanaged”, 
and reacting in the only way he knows how – with “passive resistance and open displays of contempt” 
(141). Boaz, meanwhile, remains in one place, tending to the native Harmoniums. His time on Earth 
was unpleasant, living with people who “push me this way, then they push me that – and nothing pleases 
‘em, and they get madder and madder, on account of nothing makes ‘em happy” (151) – frustrated 
people with frustrated ambitions. On Mercury, however, Boaz realises – unlike the earth people, unlike 
Unk – that while he is not free to do whatever he will, he is better able to do what he can. In this case, it 
is caring for the Harmoniums, and Boaz is simply glad that “I found me a place where I can do good 
without doing any harm” (151). Similarly, Constant and Beatrice, at the very end of their journey, 
residing in their old age on Titan with their son Crono, finally realise that it is perfectly possible to live 
happily and well without the misguided hope of being able to freely author one’s own existence. Beatrice 
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writes a book titled The True Purpose of Life in the Solar System, in which she gladly admits that “the 
forces of Tralfamadore have had something to do with the affairs of Earth”. Still, the people who had 
served those forces had done so in such “highly personalized ways” (216) that they made them their 
own. The determined nature of the Earthlings’ actions does not devalue their subjective experience – 
even if they did not make the decisions, the decisions were still “theirs” in the sense of working through 
their own particular configurations and circumstances. Beatrice tells Constant that “the worst thing that 
could possibly happen to anybody … would be to not be used for anything by anybody”, and we are told 
that “the thought relaxed her” (218). Similarly, at the very end of his life, Constant remarks that “a 
purpose of human life, no matter who is controlling it, is to love whoever is around to be loved” (220). 
This “use” is not meant in the sense of exploitation, but in the sense of mutual utility – and this “love” 
is not meant in the sense of romantic or possessive love, but in the sense of something far broader and 
more inclusive. In the Space Opera burlesque of The Sirens of Titan, Vonnegut discards the gewgaws of 
divine purpose and of human free will without losing positive value or falling into cheap cynicism. In 
his 1976 novel Slapstick, he would turn a similarly critical eye upon traditional notions of love. 
 
“Love is where you find it. I think it is foolish to go looking for it,  
and I think it can often be poisonous.” 
— Kurt Vonnegut, Slapstick 
 
Slapstick is generally considered by critics (and by the author himself) as Vonnegut’s weakest 
novel3, and it is understandable why many remain cool towards it. Taking the form of the autobiography 
of Dr. Wilbur Daffodil-11 Swain, the novel portrays a post-apocalyptic future in which the world 
population has been decimated, and Western civilisation has collapsed due to oil shortages, plagues and 
bizarre, weather-like changes in local gravity. Swain lives in the ruins of the Empire State Building with 
his granddaughter, and relates in vignettes his previous life. He was born, with his twin sister Eliza, to 
upper class parents, but with hideous disfigurements – “we were monsters, and we were not expected 
to live very long … we were neanderthaloids. We had the features of adult, fossil human beings even in 
infancy – massive brow-ridges, sloping foreheads, and steamshovel jaws” (31). Though assumed by 
everyone to be congenital idiots, Wilbur and Eliza are of normal intelligence, and soon discover that 
when they are in close physical contact they become a hyper-intelligent gestalt, capable of solving the 
world’s most intractable social, scientific and political problems. They are, however, separated after 
revealing their intelligence to their parents. Their relationship becomes acrimonious, and eventually 
Eliza dies in an accident on Mars. Wilbur eventually becomes president of the United States, running 
on a slogan of “Lonesome No More!”, and institutes a policy of artificial extended families, in which 
every citizen of the country is randomly assigned a secondary surname (such as Daffodil-11). Despite 
the fall of civilisation, Swain’s artificial families live on. 
Slapstick is a bizarre, messy novel, and would certainly be little more than a loose collection of 
gimcrack sci-fi tropes were it not for the thematic and stylistic unity conferred on it by its essential 
subject – the various forms and conceptions of love. In the prologue, Vonnegut explains that the book 
is “the closest I will ever come to writing an autobiography”, and he gave it the title “Slapstick” because 
“grotesque, situational poetry”, like that of Laurel and Hardy films, is “what life feels like to me” (11). 
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He notes that there was little love in their films, and muses that that is why “I find it natural to discuss 
life without ever mentioning love” since “it does not seem important to me.” What is more important, 
in Vonnegut’s estimation, is “common decency”: 
I have had some experiences with love, or think I have, anyway, although the ones I have liked 
best could easily be described as ‘common decency’. I treated somebody well for a little while, 
or maybe even a tremendously long time, and that person treated me well in turn. Love need 
not have anything to do with it. (12) 
Of course, treating someone else decently is not mutually exclusive with love. However, it is not love per 
se that Vonnegut is suspicious of, but the possessiveness and overt, overwhelming passion that is often 
implicit in its conventional, “romantic” form. As such, when “people who are conventionally supposed 
to love each other” fight, Vonnegut would rather they say to each other “please – a little less love, and a 
little more common decency” (12) than play up to their emotions (not to mention the conventional cues 
of how a lover’s quarrel “should” proceed). The emotional distancing that is required when one insists 
on mutual decency over love, far from encouraging solitariness or selfishness, provides the space 
necessary for people to better understand each other. 
The twins of Vonnegut’s story play out this dynamic at the beginning of their lives. Safely 
ensconced in a remote mansion, hidden from the world by their ashamed parents, Wilbur and Eliza find 
that “happiness was being perpetually in each other’s company … and growing up as specialized halves 
of a single brain”. Though they “pawed and embraced each other a good deal”, their intentions are 
“purely intellectual … Eliza and I used bodily contact only in order to increase the intimacy of our brains 
… thus did we give birth to a single genius” (47). Each twin brings a different but mutually co-dependant 
aspect to this “single genius” that is “the most important individual in our lives, but which we never 
named” (48) – just as in (inaccurate) pop science conceptions of the lateralised human brain, Wilbur is 
logical and methodical whereas Eliza is intuitive and emotional. Together, they are startlingly 
intelligent. Entirely self-taught, they learn several languages, critique Darwin and Newton, and rewrite 
the American constitution - which they consider, in its original form, “as good a scheme for misery as 
any” (49). The twins are happy, fulfilled, and productive, living in near-completely interrelated intimacy 
and solidarity. Love, as Wilbur makes clear in his reminiscence, plays no part in their Edenic state – it 
would be as redundant to their continued functioning as it would be between the hemispheres of the 
brain. When their mother, “temporarily insane” on the eve of the twins’ fifteenth birthday, breaks down 
and asks how she could ever love “a pair of drooling totem poles” (60), the twins, far from feeling 
rejected (being “about as emotionally vulnerable as the Great Stone Face in New Hampshire”) feel 
beholden to respond to their mother’s distress intellectually: “we enjoyed solving problems”, they 
explain. While they need “a mother and father’s love about as much as a fish needs a bicycle”, they 
nevertheless “admire her unwavering decency toward one and all” (61), and seek to aid her however 
they can. Unfortunately, their solution – revealing their intelligence to their parents – eventually leads 
to their being separated, and the catastrophic rift between the twins is the first point where claims of 
love begin to be laid. Hiding his work away, separated from Eliza, Wilbur remembers that many of the 
books they read together “said that love was the most important thing of all”, and experimentally tells 
Eliza that he loves her. Eliza, ever the intuitively and emotionally intelligent twin, cannot abide the 
platitude: 
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‘It’s as though you were pointing a gun at my head,’ she said. ‘It’s just a way of getting somebody 
to say something they probably don’t mean. What else can I say, or anybody say, but, “I love 
you, too”?’ (89) 
As Lauren Berlant notes, the danger of “working in an emotional vernacular is that it brings with it 
narrative and affective promises: it is a genre of sorts” (690). When the bonds of genuinely mutual 
understanding and dependence are lost, generic convention is forced to take over, and when convention 
is not only unsatisfactory but threateningly normative, it leads to alienation and acrimony. Wilbur and 
Eliza had lived a life of common decency (between themselves, towards others) but are now stuck in the 
same predicament as the rest of humanity. They are isolated, and left only with culturally sanctioned 
sentiment in place of real companionship. 
The twins’ solution for the loneliness of modern life, artificial extended families, is a 
modification of an idea Vonnegut had toyed with for several years. Inspired by the work of Robert 
Redfield, Vonnegut often spoke in favour of “folk societies”, arguing in a 1971 address that “we are full 
of chemicals which require us to belong to folk societies, or failing that, to feel lousy all the time” – and 
that this is why people form clubs and organisations about “this or that narrow aspect of life”. What 
they really desire when they do so, Vonnegut believes, is “the simpleminded, brotherly conditions of a 
folk society” (Wampeters, Foma and Granfalloons 169-70) – again, not love, but commonality and 
community. The extremely limited sphere of the nuclear family is also vulnerable to collapse because of 
this lack, as Vonnegut would note five years after Slapstick’s publication: 
Marriage is collapsing because our families are too small. A man cannot be a whole society to a 
woman, and a woman cannot be a whole society to a man. We try, but it is scarcely surprising 
that so many of us go to pieces. (Palm Sunday 175) 
In Slapstick, the artificial familial bonds are designed not to replace but supplement existing ones, and 
special care is made to ensure each family cuts across social and economic boundaries – the current 
unofficial extended families of physicians, lawyers, politicians, and the like are “the bad sorts of 
extended families [since] they excluded children and old people and housewives, and losers of every 
description” (124). Critics have been sharply divided on the success of this scheme, in theory and 
(fictional) practice. While Broer argues that its “modest, humane, democratic, and almost comically 
practical’ goals are laudable precisely for their simplicity” (177), Robert Tally Jr. sees the scheme as 
nothing but a recipe for elevating “the worst aspects of bad-old-nationalism … to the level of blood-
feuds” (104), redrawing rather than erasing old battle lines. There is, however, explicitly nothing 
utopian in the artificial family plan. It is not intended as a panacea for all mankind’s ills, but as an 
analgesia for its loneliness. Certainly, Wilbur has no illusions about universal love or harmony somehow 
arising from these new structures; as he explains to a sceptical voter, anyone would be as free to hate 
their artificial relatives as they already are their blood, and are able and likely to show favouritism 
towards their own. Nevertheless, the vertical, distributed nature of the new families would (ideally) 
mitigate the tendency of the powerful to mix horizontally and exclusively with the powerful, and would 
finally include the destitute, lonely and shunned people of America in something resembling a 
community. In the Oval Office, President Wilbur Swain is visited by a dishwasher from the kitchens 
who is “so embarrassed that he choked every time he tried to speak”, but finally manages to articulate 
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his message – that he, too, is a Daffodil-11. Wilbur embraces him – “‘My brother,’ I said” (133-34) – a 
gesture of common decency, if nothing else. 
 
“It's been the university experience that taught me that there is a very good reason [that 
you write books], that you catch people before they become generals and presidents and 
so forth and you poison their minds with … humanity.” 
— Kurt Vonnegut, “A Talk With Kurt Vonnegut Jr.” 
 
Since he first came to critical attention, Vonnegut has garnered a reputation amongst critics 
and the public as a nihilist, an arch-pessimist, a black humourist and unremitting misanthrope4 – and, 
not un-relatedly, occasionally as frankly un-American. A fairly illustrative example of Vonnegut 
courting, unwittingly or not, such a reputation is his performance on a CBS live panel on day of the 1969 
moon landing headed by Walter Cronkite. Charles Shields records that  “Kurt remarked that putting 
space exploration ahead of eradicating poverty was morally ‘untenable’ … over the next several days, 
CBS received thousands of angry, insulting letters complaining that Vonnegut [was] un-American and 
had spoiled the event” (264). Tellingly, Cronkite described Vonnegut as “bitter”. Similarly, 
Slaughterhouse-Five was burnt in North Dakota in the year of its release, its depiction of war and its 
absurdities decried as “unpatriotic” (Bosmajian 201). In both cases, and in his work generally, Vonnegut 
cannot help but go against the grain of the American mainstream. Despite his essential identification 
with the values of the American project (the “junior civics” values he so thoroughly took to heart), there 
are intractable philosophical and political differences between his work and the reality of the United 
States, and it is this disjunction that often elicits rancour. Stanley Cavell, in a 1969 essay on King Lear, 
points out the facet of the American self-image that Vonnegut has repeatedly run up against: 
[America’s] need for love is insatiable. It has surely been given more love than any other nation: 
its history, until yesterday, is one in which outsiders have been drawn to it and in which insiders 
are hoarse from their expressions of devotion to it. Those who voice politically radical wishes 
for this country may forget the radical hopes it holds for itself, and not know that the hatred of 
America by its intellectuals is only their own version of patriotism. It is the need for love as 
proof of its existence which makes it so frighteningly destructive, enraged by ingratitude and by 
attention to its promises rather than to its promise … It imagines its evils to come from outside. 
So it feels watched, isolated in its mounting of waters, denying its shame with mechanical lungs 
of pride, calling its wrath upon the wrong objects. (345) 
This overwhelming requirement for unequivocal love – for unequivocal positivity – is singularly 
unhelpful, since it presupposes the conditions necessary to bring itself about, while refusing to accept 
the critical perspective necessary to ensure that those conditions actually come about. The American 
Dream, after all, has always posited that since the nation’s beginning the conditions required for 
individual success, for peace, prosperity and happiness, have, always and already, been in place. 
Checking to see whether the material reality of most of the citizens’ lives match up to the ideal barely 
seems to warrant consideration. It is with the blindness inherent in this optimism that Vonnegut takes 
issue, and his criticism of many of the fundamental aspects of American culture is his “own version of 
patriotism”. In this respect, I am in full agreement with John R. May, who notes that Vonnegut’s 
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tendency in his novels to “limit the humanly possible so severely” paradoxically creates the conditions 
necessary for “genuine hope”, no matter how unlikely or small that hope may be (28). The avenues of 
infinite potential and free agency that Vonnegut explicitly closes off were almost certainly never feasible 
in the first place, and as such serve as distractions from and impediments to what might otherwise be 
done. In a later novel, Hocus Pocus, the protagonist, Eugene Debs Hartke, offhandedly comments that 
“another flaw in the human character is that everybody wants to build and nobody wants to do 
maintenance” (198) – essentially, that people (and governments) tend to neglect the less glamorous 
fundamentals in favour of ambition and idealism. When Vonnegut criticised the Apollo program, he 
was not doing so because he was inherently opposed to the idea of space exploration, but because he 
believed it represented a fundamentally misaligned set of priorities – setting off on an expensive and 
distractingly showy adventure without first getting one’s house in order. In The Sirens of Titan, 
Vonnegut takes aim at precisely the aspect of American culture Tanner identifies in City of Words – the 
desire to live a self-authored, individualistic, independent existence. Instead, the travails of Constant 
and Beatrice, constantly struggling to assert themselves, end only when they accept a more modest, 
realistic alternative:  the desire to flourish rather than to succeed, and to do what one can rather than 
what one will. It is only after doing so that they can achieve any higher state of human happiness. In 
Slapstick, love, or at least its conventional form, is at best a luxury and at worst a claim of possession 
that leads to bitterness and acrimony. What Wilbur Daffodill-11 Swain achieves naturally with his sister 
and attempts to provide for the people of the United States with his artificial families is, again, a more 
modest but more durable and compassionate form of human relationship, a bond of understanding, 
common decency and communality. These are only pessimistic aims when they are compared to 
unrealistic notions - of the always-already existing utopia of the United States, of untrammelled free 
will or of romantic love as a pure and essential redemptive force. Indeed, the only time Vonnegut is 
genuinely pessimistic is when it comes to the ability and willingness of people and of nations to come 
around to these modest goals:  to discard inane optimism and foolish utopian hopes, to instead focus 
on what needs to be done to make life tolerable rather than perfect. Pessimism this may be, but it is a 
kind pessimism. It is also a necessary one, if any kind of improvement in the human condition is possibly 
to be achieved, rather than merely dreamt. 
 
Notes 
1 In one of the last radio interviews of his life, Vonnegut is unremittingly bleak, arguing that it 
is about time humanity “packed it in” and went the way of the dinosaurs, since human beings, in their 
abuse of the planet, “are in revolt against life itself” (“Kurt Vonnegut: 10 Years of Provocative Radio”) 
2 Belief or disbelief in free will appears to be fairly malleable, but only when stimuli are 
introduced to induce doubt. Sarkissian et al. have shown that the beliefs that “our universe is 
indeterministic” and that “moral responsibility is not compatible with determinism” is strikingly 
prevalent cross-culturally (“Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal?”). It is probably safe to say, 
subjectively speaking, that an inherent belief in free will is almost always our ‘default’ perspective. 
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3 Vonnegut notes in Palm Sunday that the novel was received negatively in The New York 
Times, Time, Newsweek, The New York Review of Books, The Village Voice, and Rolling Stone. In 
chapter 18 of the same book, “The Sexual Revolution”, Vonnegut grades Slapstick, as a “D” grade. 
4 A particularly scathing example among Vonnegut’s reviewers is Peter Prescott. In a review of 
Breakfast of Champions (1973), for example, he derides his “smug pessimism” (“Vexed with Vonnegut” 
14) as “pretentious, hypocritical manure”, and takes particular exception to Vonnegut’s mechanistic 
portrayal of human beings as “facile fatalism” (15). Critics, especially in the 1970s, often criticised 
Vonnegut’s pessimistic outlook. An illustrative example is Lynn Buck, who argues that Vonnegut’s 
“nihilistic message” (196) is that life has degenerated to something beneath a lousy joke (182). Clinton 
Burhans, similarly, argues that “for Vonnegut, [man] can neither find nor create meaning or purpose 
order or beauty…he succeeds best at making himself ridiculous and his life unliveable” (185). 
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